HB 513 - Civil Practice Act: Anti-SLAPP by Noebes, Pierre-Joseph & Reed, Rachel
Georgia State University Law Review
Volume 33
Issue 1 Fall 2016 Article 8
11-8-2016
HB 513 - Civil Practice Act: Anti-SLAPP
Pierre-Joseph Noebes
Georgia State University College of Law, pierrenoebes@gmail.com
Rachel Reed
Georgia State University College of Law, rachelpastor@gmail.com
Follow this and additional works at: https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr
Part of the Legislation Commons
This Peach Sheet is brought to you for free and open access by the Publications at Reading Room. It has been accepted for inclusion in Georgia State
University Law Review by an authorized editor of Reading Room. For more information, please contact mbutler@gsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Pierre-Joseph Noebes & Rachel Reed, HB 513 - Civil Practice Act: Anti-SLAPP, 33 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 109 (2016).
Available at: https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol33/iss1/8
 109
CIVIL PRACTICE 
Civil Practice Act: Amend Article 2 of Chapter 6 of Title 5 of the 
Official Code of Georgia Annotated, Relating to Appellate Practice, 
so as to Revise Provisions Regarding Those Judgments and Rulings 
Deemed Directly Appealable; Amend Article 3 of Chapter 11 of 
Title 9 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated, Relating to 
Pleadings and Motions, so as to Revise Provisions Regarding the 
Procedure for Claims Asserted Against a Person or Entity Arising 
from an Act by that Person or Entity Which Could Reasonably Be 
Construed as an Act in Furtherance of the Right of Free Speech or 
the Right to Petition Government for a Redress of Grievances; 
Revise Definitions; Amend Chapter 5 of Title 51 of the Official 
Code of Georgia Annotated, Relating to Libel and Slander, so as to 
Revise a Cross-reference; Provide for Related Matters; Provide for 
an Effective Date; Repeal Conflicting Laws; And for Other 
Purposes 
CODE SECTIONS: O.C.G.A. §§ 5-6-34 (amended), 
9-11-11.1 (amended), 51-5-7 
(amended) 
BILL NUMBER: HB 513 
ACT NUMBER: 420 
GEORGIA LAWS: 2016 Ga. Laws 341 
SUMMARY: The Act amends Georgia’s anti-SLAPP 
statute to expand its coverage from 
protecting the right to petition to also 
include protecting the right of free 
speech in connection with an issue of 
public interest or concern. Claims 
brought against those involved in such 
activities shall be subject to a motion to 
strike, unless the court determines that 
the nonmoving party has established a 
probability that the claimant can 
prevail on the merits. If the moving 
party succeeds on a motion to strike, 
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the court will award the party 
attorney’s fees and costs associated 
with the motion. Any order granting or 
denying a motion to strike will be 
immediately appealable. 
EFFECTIVE DATE: July 1, 2016 
History 
In 2000, Georgia Community Support & Solutions, Inc. (“GCSS”), 
a nonprofit organization that assists adults with disabilities and their 
families, placed Shirley Berryhill’s mentally disabled adult son with 
an independently contracted caregiver. 1  In 2002, Berryhill began 
posting complaints about the quality of care GCSS was providing her 
son on a website for families of adults with disabilities. 2  In her 
complaints, Berryhill claimed, among other things, that her son had 
rapidly lost thirty-five to forty pounds, had no clothes and no bed, 
had been beaten, and had become afraid to speak to family.3 In 2003, 
Berryhill voiced her concerns once again in an email sent to about 
forty people, including one who worked for the Atlanta Journal 
Constitution, and another who worked for the Georgia Department of 
Human Resources.4 
Following this email, the contents of which Berryhill also posted 
on the website for families of adults with disabilities, GCSS sent 
Berryhill a letter demanding a retraction and apology. 5  GCSS 
received neither.6 In response, the organization filed a defamation 
and tortious interference with business relationships suit against 
Berryhill. 7  GCSS’s complaint alleged that Berryhill maliciously 
published false information about the organization and its executive 
director online.8 Berryhill countered by stating that she had made the 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Ga. Cmty. Support & Sols., Inc. v. Berryhill, 275 Ga. App. 189, 189, 620 S.E.2d 178, 179–80 
(2005), aff’d 281 Ga. 439, 638 S.E.2d 278 (2006). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. at 190, 620 S.E.2d at 180. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Ga. Cmty. Support & Sols., Inc., 275 Ga. App. at 190, 620 S.E.2d at 180. 
 8. Id. at 189, 620 S.E.2d at 179. 
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statements in good faith and in the hopes that others, particularly the 
Atlanta Journal Constitution and Georgia Department of Resources, 
could help investigate her concerns about her son’s treatment and 
“remedy such concerns, if possible.”9  Berryhill filed a motion to 
dismiss, arguing that her statements fell under the protection of 
Georgia’s current anti-SLAPP statute and that GCSS had failed to 
comply with the statute’s verification requirements.10 
“SLAPP” stands for “strategic lawsuit against public 
participation.”11 Plaintiffs most often use SLAPP suits to stifle the 
speech of adverse parties. 12  Accordingly, anti-SLAPP legislation 
aims to thaw the chilling effects these suits can have on protected 
free speech. 13  At the time GCSS filed its suit against Berryhill, 
Georgia’s anti-SLAPP statute attempted to achieve this aim by 
identifying protected speech and requiring potential SLAPP 
claimants and their attorneys to attest to the validity of their claims 
by filing a written verification.14 The verification required claimants 
to certify under oath that their claims were well grounded in fact and 
law, did not involve privileged communication, and were not 
imposed for an improper purpose; namely to suppress a person’s 
right of free speech or petition.15 If a claimant failed to sufficiently 
verify the claim, the court would strike the claim.16 If a claimant 
verified his claim in violation of the statute, “the court, upon motion 
or upon its initiative” would impose a sanction, which could include 
dismissal of the claim or an order to pay the adverse party’s legal 
expenses.17 
At the time of the Berryhill suit—and until the enactment of HB 
513 in 2016—Georgia’s anti-SLAPP statute limited protected speech 
to the following: 
                                                                                                                 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. at 191, 620 S.E.2d at 181. 
 11. SLAPP, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 12. Id. 
 13. See, e.g., O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1(a–b) (2015). 
 14. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1(b). 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
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Any written or oral statement, writing, or petition made 
before or to a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, 
or any other official proceeding authorized by law, or any 
written or oral statement, writing, or petition made in 
connection with an issue under consideration or review by 
a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other 
official proceeding authorized by law.18 
In essence, the statute narrowed protected speech to statements 
made in connection with official government proceedings.19 When a 
person spoke on an issue not currently under consideration or review 
through an official proceeding, no anti-SLAPP protections applied.20 
It is this provision that proved determinative in Georgia Community 
Support & Solutions, Inc. v. Berryhill. 
The trial court granted Berryhill’s motion to dismiss, finding 
Georgia’s anti-SLAPP statute applied to her statements and that 
GCSS had failed to satisfy the statute’s verification requirements 
imposed by that statute, but the Georgia Court of Appeals reversed 
this ruling.21 The appellate court found that Georgia’s anti-SLAPP 
statute did not apply to Berryhill’s statements because they had not 
been made in connection with any official proceedings.22 Even if 
Berryhill had hoped that her speech would lead to an official 
investigation of GCSS and her son’s treatment, this aspiration alone 
failed to bring her statements within the narrow scope of protected 
speech articulated in the anti-SLAPP statute.23 In 2006, the Supreme 
Court of Georgia affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision.24 
Proponents of HB 513, including its sponsor, Representative Ron 
Stephens (R-164th), state that citizens who speak out on issues of 
public concern, like Berryhill, are among the people who will receive 
protection under an expanded anti-SLAPP statute.25  However, the 
                                                                                                                 
 18. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1(c). 
 19. Id. 
 20. See id. 
 21. Ga. Cmty. Support & Sols., 275 Ga. App. at 190, 620 S.E.2d at 180. 
 22. Id. at 192, 620 S.E.2d at 181–82. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Berryhill v. Ga. Cmty. Support & Sols., Inc., 281 Ga. 439, 439, 638 S.E.2d 278, 280 (2006). 
 25. Video Recording of House Non-Civil Judiciary Committee Meeting, Feb. 24, 2016 at 40 min., 
35 sec. (remarks by Rep. Ed Setzler (R-35th)), http://www.house.ga.gov/Committees/en-
US/CommitteeArchives146.aspx [hereinafter House Committee Video]. 
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true driving force behind HB 513 is the legislature’s desire to appeal 
to Georgia’s booming, corporate film industry rather than a civic 
concern for the free speech rights of “the little guy.”26 
In large part, HB 513 was “brought to you by the film industry,” 
and enjoyed strong support from the American Motion Picture 
Association. 27  As Peter Canfield, a First Amendment attorney, 
explained during a House Judiciary Non-Civil Committee meeting, 
celebrities and the broader film industry often attract lawsuits. 28 
Because of this tendency, the film industry desires a legal 
environment where it can receive an early determination of these 
cases on the merits without having to incur the high costs of 
discovery and court proceedings for claims that turn out to be 
frivolous.29 In an effort to foster this type of environment, the authors 
of HB 513 modeled the bill after California’s anti-SLAPP statute, 
perhaps the most expansive anti-SLAPP provision in effect in the 
United States.30 
Bill Tracking of HB 513 
Consideration and Passage by the House 
Representative Ron Stephens (R-164th) sponsored HB 513 in the 
House.31 The House read the bill for the first time on March 2, 2015, 
and was committed to State Planning and Community Affairs. 32 
Speaker David Ralston (R-7th) withdrew the bill from State Planning 
and Community Affairs and recommitted the bill to the House 
                                                                                                                 
 26. House Committee Video, supra note 25, at 33 min., 8 sec. (remarks by Rep. Ron Stephens (R-
164th)). 
 27. Id.; Interview with Rep. Stacey Evans (D-42nd) (June 29, 2016) (expressing her concerns that 
because HB 513 was heavily influenced by the film industry it is “not an anti-SLAPP bill,” and that “the 
film industry and big media are [using it as] a way to reduce their fact checking time and costs”) 
[hereinafter Evans Interview]. 
 28. House Committee Video, supra note 25, at 38 min., 5 sec. (remarks by Peter Canfield, Attorney). 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 35 min., 15 sec. (remarks by Peter Canfield, Attorney); U.S. Needs an Anti-SLAPP Law 
like California’s, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 16, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-ed-slapp-
20150816-story.html. 
 31. Georgia General Assembly, HB 513, Bill Tracking, http://www.legis.ga.gov/legislation/en-
US/Display/20152016/HB/513. 
 32. State of Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, HB 513, May 5, 2016. 
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Judiciary Non-Civil Committee.33 The House read the bill for the 
second time on March 3, 2015.34 On February 25, 2016, the House 
Judiciary Non-Civil Committee amended the bill in part and 
favorably reported the bill by substitute.35 
The Committee substitute included most of the introduced bill’s 
text, and merely removed or changed the text of a few subsections.36 
The Committee substitute changed some of the language found in 
Section 1 of the bill beginning at line thirty-two.37 The language 
requiring a nonmoving party to establish that “he or she would be 
likely to prevail on a motion for summary judgment brought by the 
moving party pursuant to Code section 9-11-35” was removed.38 In 
its place, the Committee substitute stated “an issue of public interest 
or concern shall be subject to a motion to strike unless the court 
determines that the nonmoving party has established that there is a 
probability that the nonmoving party will prevail on the claim.”39 
The Committee substitute also changed the language found under 
subsection (b.1) of Section 1, related to recovery of attorney’s fees 
and expenses of litigation. 40  Yet, like the changes above, these 
changes were merely superficial and did not alter the effect of the 
subsection.41 The Committee substitute also removed subsection (e), 
which stated, “an order granting or denying a motion to dismiss or a 
motion to strike shall be immediately appealable.” 42  Finally, the 
Committee substitute removed some of the language found in Section 
3 of the bill so that it stated, “[t]his Act shall become effective on 
July 1, 2016.”43 
                                                                                                                 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Compare HB 513, as introduced, 2015 Ga. Gen. Assemb., with HB 513 (HCS), 2016 Ga. Gen. 
Assemb. 
 37. Id. 
 38. HB 513, as introduced, 2015 Ga. Gen. Assemb. 
 39. HB 513 (HCS), § 1, p. 2, ll. 30–33, 2016 Ga. Gen. Assemb. 
 40. HB 513, as introduced, § 1, pp. 2–3, ll. 61–65, 2015 Ga. Gen. Assemb. 
 41. Compare HB 513, as introduced, § 1, pp. 2–3, ll. 61–65, 2015 Ga. Gen. Assemb., with HB 513 
(HCS), § 1, pp. 2–3, ll. 61–68, 2016 Ga. Gen. Assemb. 
 42. Compare HB 513, as introduced, § 1, p. 3, ll. 86–87, 2015 Ga. Gen. Assemb., with HB 513 
(HCS), 2016 Ga. Gen. Assemb. 
 43. Compare HB 513, as introduced, § 3, p. 4, ll. 106–07, 2015 Ga. Gen. Assemb., with HB 513 
(HCS), § 3, p. 4, l. 106, 2016 Ga. Gen. Assemb. 
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The House read the bill for the third time on February 29, 2016.44 
Representative Evans (D-42nd) offered a floor amendment that 
deleted “to revise definitions” on line 5 and replaced lines 17 through 
104 of the Committee substitute with alternate text. 45  This 
amendment sought to remove the requirement that a nonmoving 
party must establish a probability of prevailing on a claim, which 
would ultimately remove the requirement that a plaintiff show actual 
malice in order to defeat a defendant’s motion to strike. 46 
Representatives in the House objected to Representative Evans’s 
floor amendment, and it was not adopted after losing a vote 71 to 
98. 47  The House passed the Committee substitute of HB 513 on 
February 29, 2016, by a vote of 131 to 41.48 
Consideration and Passage by the Senate 
Senator Charlie Bethel (R-54th) sponsored HB 513 in the Senate.49 
The Senate first read HB 513 on March 2, 2016.50 HB 513 was 
assigned to the Senate Committee on Economic Development and 
Tourism, which made a number of amendments to the bill.51 
The Senate Committee added back into the bill language to address 
how and where anti-SLAPP cases may be appealed.52 The Committee 
revised subsection (a) of Code section 5-6-34, relating to judgments 
and rulings deemed directly appealable, adding “all judgments or 
orders entered pursuant to [the anti-SLAPP statute]” may be appealed 
to the Georgia Supreme Court or Court of Appeals.53 
                                                                                                                 
 44. State of Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, HB 513, May 5, 2016. 
 45. Failed House Floor Amendment to HB 513, introduced by Rep. Stacey Evans (D-42nd), Feb. 29, 
2016. 
 46. Id.; Video Recording of House Proceedings, Feb. 29, 2016 at 56 mins. (remarks by Rep. Stacey 
Evans (D-42nd)), http://www.gpb.org/lawmakers/2016/day-30 [hereinafter House Floor Vote Video]. 
 47. House Floor Vote Video, supra note 45. at 1 hr., 3 mins., 32 sec. (remarks by Speaker David 
Ralston (R-7th)). 
 48. Id. at 1 hr., 4 mins., 27 sec. (remarks by Speaker David Ralston (R-7th)). 
 49. See Georgia General Assembly, HB 513, Bill Tracking, http://www.legis.ga.gov/legislation/en-
US/Display/20152016/HB/513 
 50. State of Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, HB 513, May 5, 2016. 
 51. Id.; Compare HB 513 (HCS), 2016 Ga. Gen. Assemb., with HB 513 (SCS), 2016 Ga. Gen. 
Assemb. 
 52. HB 513 (SCS), § 1, p. 1, ll. 12–45, 2016 Ga. Gen. Assemb. 
 53. HB 513 (SCS), § 1, p. 2, ln. 45, 2016 Ga. Gen. Assemb. 
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In Section 2, the Committee also made some revisions to Code 
section 9-11-11.1.54  First, under subsection (b)(2), the Committee 
added language to provide for cases where “the nonmoving party is a 
public figure plaintiff,” allowing such nonmoving party “discovery 
on the sole issue of actual malice.”55 Second, the Committee revised 
the bill to ensure that entities, as well as persons, have the right of 
petition or free speech, and included “any other conduct in 
furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or 
free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public 
concern” to the list of recognized acts in furtherance of this right.56 
Finally, the Committee updated cross-references to maintain 
consistency.57 
The Senate Committee on Economic Development and Tourism 
favorably reported the bill by substitute on March 11, 2016.58 The 
Senate read the bill for the second time on March 14, 2016, and for 
the third time on March 16, 2016.59 No Senate floor amendments 
were introduced, and on March 16, 2016, the Senate passed the 
Committee substitute of HB 513 without objection by a vote of 50 to 
2.60 
The Senate transmitted the bill to the House on March 22, 2016.61 
The House agreed to the Senate’s version of the bill, as amended, on 
the same day, by a vote of 117 to 45.62 The House sent the bill to 
Governor Nathan Deal (R) on March 29, 2016; the Governor signed 
the bill into law on April 26, 2016, and the bill became effective on 
July 1, 2016.63 
                                                                                                                 
 54. HB 513 (SCS), § 2, pp. 2–5, 2016 Ga. Gen. Assemb. 
 55. HB 513 (SCS), § 2, p. 3, ll. 88–93, 2016 Ga. Gen. Assemb. 
 56. HB 513 (SCS), § 2, p. 4, ll. 108–13, 2016 Ga. Gen. Assemb. 
 57. HB 513 (SCS) § 2, p. 4, ll. 128–29, 2016 Ga. Gen. Assemb. 
 58. State of Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, HB 513, May 5, 2016. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Video Recording of Senate Proceedings, March 16, 2016 at 5 mins., 50 sec. (remarks by LG 
Casey Cagle), http://www.gpb.org/lawmakers/2016/day-38.; id. at 7 mins., 10 sec. (remarks by LG 
Cagle). 
 61. State of Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, HB 513, May 5, 2016. 
 62. Georgia House of Representatives Voting Record, HB 513 (Mar. 22, 2016). 
 63. State of Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, HB 513, May 5, 2016. 
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The Act 
The Act amends the following portions of the Official Code of 
Georgia Annotated: Article 2 of Chapter 6 of Title 5, relating to 
appellate practice; Article 3 of Chapter 11 of Title 9, relating to 
pleadings and motions; and Chapter 5 of Title 51, relating to libel and 
slander.64 The overall purpose of the Act is to encourage citizens’ 
participation in matters of public interest by deterring lawsuits 
brought primarily for the purpose of chilling people’s and entities’ 
constitutional rights of petition and free speech.65 
Section 1 
Section 1 of the Act revises subsection (a) of Code section 5-6-34, 
which provides a list of judgments and orders deemed directly 
appealable.66 The Act maintains all of the original language of the 
Code section, and simply adds to the existing list of directly 
appealable judgments, “all judgments or orders entered pursuant to 
Code section 9-11-11.1.”67 
Section 2 
Section 2 of the Act amends Code section 9-11-11.1, which relates 
to exercising the rights of free speech and petition, legislative 
findings, verification of claims, definitions, procedure on motions, 
exception, and legal fees and expenses.68 Specifically, the Act makes 
two significant substantive changes to Georgia’s anti-SLAPP 
statute. 69  First, the Act creates a new procedural mechanism for 
defendants to request an early determination of potential SLAPP suits 
on the merits. 70  Second, the Act broadens the scope of first 
                                                                                                                 
 64. 2016 Ga. Laws 341, §§ 1–5, at 341–44. 
 65. Id. 
 66. 2016 Ga. Laws 341, § 1, at 341–42. 
 67. O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34(a)(13) (Supp. 2016). 
 68. 2016 Ga. Laws 341, § 2, at 342–43. 
 69. Aside from these substantive changes, the Act also replaces the phrase “the right to petition 
government for a redress of grievances” with simply, the ‘right of petition” throughout Code section 
9-11-11.1. 2016 Ga. Laws 341, § 2, at 342–44. 
 70. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1(b) (Supp. 2016). 
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amendment activities protected under the statute to include all speech 
and conduct occurring “in connection with an issue of public interest 
or concern.”71 
The new language of subsection (b)(1) provides that potential 
SLAPP claims “shall be subject to a motion to strike unless the court 
determines the nonmoving party has established that there is a 
probability that the nonmoving party will prevail on the claim.”72 
This means that upon a defendant’s motion to strike, the court will 
make an early determination of the plaintiff’s potential SLAPP 
claims on the merits. 73  Subsection (b)(2) outlines what the court 
should consider in evaluating these claims, and subsection (b)(3) 
provides that once the court reaches a determination on the merits, 
“neither that determination nor the fact of such determination shall be 
admissible in evidence at any later stage of the case.”74 
The Act also adds subsection (b.1), which requires the court to 
award attorney’s fees and litigation expenses to the SLAPP defendant 
on a successful motion to strike.75 Subsection (b.1) further provides 
that the court must award attorney’s fees and litigation expenses to 
the nonmoving party, the SLAPP plaintiff, should the court find that 
the motion to strike is frivolous or solely filed to cause delay.76 After 
the court decides the motion to dismiss or motion to strike, either 
party can directly appeal the order in accordance with subsection (a) 
of Code section 5-6-34 as amended by Section 1 of the Act.77 
In addition to these procedural changes, the Act expands the scope 
of activities afforded anti-SLAPP protection under Code section 
9-11-11.1.78 Subsection (c) defines the term, “act in furtherance of 
the person’s or entity’s right of petition or free speech under the 
Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the State of 
Georgia in connection with an issue of public or concern.”79 The Act 
adds subsections (c)(3) to Code section 9-11-11.1 to expand the 
                                                                                                                 
 71. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1(c). 
 72. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1(b)(1). 
 73. See id. 
 74. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1(b)(2)–(3). 
 75. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1(b.1). 
 76. Id. 
 77. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1(e); 2016 Ga. Laws 341, § 2, at 344. 
 78. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1(c). 
 79. Id. 
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definition of protected acts to include “any written or oral statement 
or writing or petition made in a place open to the public or in a public 
forum in connection with an issue of public interest or concern.”80 
Similarly, subsection (c)(4) adds to the definition of protected acts, 
“any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional 
right of petition or free speech in connection with a public issue or an 
issue of public concern.”81 These additions effectively extend anti-
SLAPP protection to any speech or conduct connected to issues of 
public concern, regardless of whether those issues are the subject of a 
government proceeding.82 
Finally, the Act adds subsection (e) to Code section 9-11-11.1.83 
Subsection (e) provides that Code section 9-11-11.1 “shall not apply 
to any action brought by the Attorney General or a prosecuting 
attorney, or a city attorney acting as a prosecutor, to enforce laws 
aimed at public protection.”84 
Section 3 
Section 3 of the Act revises paragraph (4) of Code section 51-5-7, 
which provides a list of communications deemed privileged under 
Georgia’s libel and slander laws.85 In keeping with changes made 
throughout Section 2, the Act removes the phrase “the right to 
petition government for a redress of grievances” and replaces it with 
a “person’s or entity’s right of petition.”86 
Analysis 
The Expansion of Georgia’s Anti-SLAPP Protections 
Representative Stephens (R-164th), at the behest of Georgia’s 
growing film industry, introduced the Act to curb frivolous lawsuits 
designed to stifle free speech by bogging defendants down with 
                                                                                                                 
 80. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1(c)(3). 
 81. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1(c)(4). 
 82. 2016 Ga. Laws 341, § 2, at 343. 
 83. 2016 Ga. Laws 341, § 2, at 344. 
 84. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1(e). 
 85. 2016 Ga. Laws 341, § 2, at 344. 
 86. Id. 
11
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costly litigation. 87  The Act attempts to achieve this goal by 
significantly expanding the scope of claims qualifying for anti-
SLAPP protection and placing an increased burden on SLAPP 
plaintiffs to provide support for their claims. 
Prior to the Act, Code section 9-11-11.1 limited the definition of 
protectable acts to speech or petition made either during a 
government proceeding or in connection with an issue under 
consideration in a government proceeding.88 For example, if a citizen 
raised a general concern about a predatory payday loan business, 
unconnected to an ongoing official proceeding, her complaint would 
fall outside the statute’s definition of protected speech. On the other 
hand, if a citizen asserted the same complaint in a statement 
expressing support for a bill that imposed new restrictions on payday 
lenders, her statement would qualify for anti-SLAPP protection. The 
Act eliminates this inconsistency by applying anti-SLAPP protection 
to almost any claim arising out of speech or conduct connected to an 
issue of public concern, regardless of whether those issues are the 
subject of a government proceeding.89 
The Act also creates a brand new procedural mechanism for 
defendants to challenge SLAPP claims. Prior to the Act, Georgia 
guarded against SLAPP suits by requiring plaintiffs to file a written 
verification certifying that their claims were well supported in fact 
and law and not filed for an improper purpose, such as suppressing 
free speech.90 The Act eliminates the verification requirement and 
replaces it with a procedure that requires plaintiffs to demonstrate, 
rather than certify, that their claims are meritorious.91 This places an 
increased burden on plaintiffs to prove to the validity of their claims 
early in litigation, even without the benefit of extensive discovery.92 
Representative Evans, the Act’s most vocal critic, believes this 
increased burden may result in the new law being abused.93 There is, 
                                                                                                                 
 87. House Committee Video, supra note 25, at 33 min., 8 sec. (remarks by Rep. Ron Stephens (R-
164th)). 
 88. 2016 Ga. Laws 341, § 2, at 342–44. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. See 2016 Ga. Laws 341, § 2, at 342–44. 
 93. See Evans Interview, supra note 27. 
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however, no data showing systematic abuse of anti-SLAPP statutes at 
either the trial or appellate levels.94 
Applying Georgia’s Anti-SLAPP Provisions in Federal Courts 
The federal circuits take divided positions on whether Georgia’s, 
or other states’, anti-SLAPP provisions apply to claims asserted in 
federal courts.95  The issue creating the divide is uncertainty over 
whether anti-SLAPP provisions are substantive or procedural in 
nature. 96  As a general rule, federal courts sitting in diversity 
jurisdiction must apply state substantive law to resolve state law 
claims, but need not apply state laws that are merely procedural.97 
When a procedural state law conflicts with the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, the federal rules control.98Anti-SLAPP provisions create 
an interesting case because these laws “create procedural means to 
accomplish substantive policy objectives.”99 
Prior to passing HB 513, the Eleventh Circuit held that Georgia’s 
anti-SLAPP law could not be applied in federal court because it was 
procedural in nature and its verification requirements conflicted with 
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.100 Rule 11 states 
that “a pleading need not be verified or accompanied by an 
affidavit.”101 HB 513 eliminated the verification requirements from 
Georgia’s anti-SLAPP law, thus reopening the possibility that it 
could apply in federal court. However, the applicability of Georgia’s 
new provisions to federal cases is not guaranteed. Georgia’s revised 
anti-SLAPP provision, specifically its creation of a special motion to 
                                                                                                                 
 94. See Felix Shafir & Jeremy B. Rosen, California’s Anti-SLAPP Law is Not Systematically 
Abused, LAW360 (June 30, 2016), http://www.law360.com/articles/812761/california-s-anti-slapp-law-
is-not-systematically-abused. 
 95. Hamp Watson, An Erie Split: Anti-Slapp Laws, Rule 12, and Rule 56, SUNDAY SPLITS (Sept. 25, 
2013), http://sundaysplits.com/2016/09/25/an-erie-split-anti-slapp-laws-rule-12-and-rule-56/; Roni A. 
Elias, Applying Anti-SLAPP Laws in Diversity Cases: How to Protect the Substantive Public Interest in 
State Procedural Rules, 41 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 215, 215–16 (2016). 
 96. Watson, supra note 95. 
 97. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471–72 (1965). 
 98. Id. at 473; Burke v. Smith, 252 F.3d 1260, 1265 (11th Cir. 2001). 
 99. Elias, supra note 95, at 215. 
 100. PRACTICALLAW, State Anti-SLAPP Statute Does Not Apply in Federal Court: Eleventh Circuit 
(Jul. 14, 2014), http://us.practicallaw.com/5-574-4446?q=&qp=&qo=&qe=. 
 101. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(a). 
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strike, creates potential conflicts with Federal Rules 8, 12, and 56.102 
Neither the substantive or procedural nature of anti-SLAPP 
provisions, nor the narrower issue of whether functions like special 
motions to strike conflict with the Federal Rules have reached the 
Supreme Court.103 
Evaluating the Strength of HB 513 
The Public Participation Project (“PPP”) is a non-profit 
organization focused on passing federal anti-SLAPP legislation.104 
PPP also works with groups seeking to pass anti-SLAPP legislation 
at the state level.105 One of its projects includes documenting states’ 
anti-SLAPP laws and related judicial decisions. 106  As of the 
organization’s 2015 updates, twenty-eight states have some form of 
an anti-SLAPP statute.107 However, the scope of these statutes and 
the procedures used to combat the chilling effects of SLAPP suits 
vary widely.108 Of the states with some form of anti-SLAPP statute, a 
majority limit anti-SLAPP protection to statements made in 
connection with government proceedings or with the purpose of 
encouraging government action.109 Roughly a third go as far as the 
Act in expanding protection to any speech or conduct addressing an 
issue of public concern, regardless of whether the action has a direct 
connection to government action or review.110 
The expansive language in the Act closely mirrors that found in 
California Code of Civil Procedure Section 425.16.111 In addition to 
borrowing the broad definition of a protectable “act in furtherance of 
a person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States or 
                                                                                                                 
 102. 19 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE Fed. § 
4509 (3d ed. 2016). See e.g., U.S. ex rel. Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 190 F.3d 963, 
972 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 103. See Watson, supra note 95. 
 104. About, PUBLIC PARTICIPATION PROJECT, http://www.anti-slapp.org/about/staff/ (last visited Jun. 
26, 2016). 
 105. Id. 
 106. State Anti-SLAPP Laws, PUBLIC PARTICIPATION PROJECT, http://www.anti-slapp.org/your-
states-free-speech-protection/ (last visited Jun. 26, 2016). 
 107. Id. 
 108. See generally id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Compare O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1 (Supp. 2016), with Cal. Civ. Proc. Code. § 425.16 (2016). 
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California Constitution in connection with a public issue,” from the 
California Code, the Georgia Act also adopts California’s procedural 
enforcement mechanisms: early determination of potential SLAPP 
claims on the merits via a motion to strike, and a fee shifting 
provision awarding attorney’s fees and costs to the prevailing 
party.112 
California’s anti-SLAPP statute is often cited as one of the 
strongest in the nation.113 Thus, by adopting the most substantive 
provisions of California’s statute nearly word for word, the Act 
stands to put Georgia’s anti-SLAPP statute in the same echelon. In 
fact, the Act may actually result in Georgia having an even stronger 
anti-SLAPP provision than California by omitting some of the 
limitations imposed by other sections of the California Code of Civil 
Procedure. 114  Most notably, California passed Senate Bill 515, 
codified as Cal. Civ. Proc. Code. Section 425.17, in 2003, in an effort 
to roll back some of the anti-SLAPP provisions of Cal. Civ. Proc. 
Code. Section 425.16.115 Section 425.17 explicitly responds to what 
the California Legislature described as the “disturbing abuse” of 
Section 425.16’s anti-SLAPP provisions. 116  Specifically, the 
California legislature wanted to curb use of the anti-SLAPP statute 
against public-interest plaintiffs.117The statute addresses the problem 
by excepting some public interest actions, and certain actions arising 
from commercial speech or conduct from Section 425.16’s 
protections.118 Georgia’s Act contains no similar limitations.119 
                                                                                                                 
 112. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code. § 425.16(b)-(c). 
 113. U.S. Needs an Anti-SLAPP Law like California’s, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 16, 2015), 
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-ed-slapp-20150816-story.html. 
 114. Compare O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1, with Cal. Civ. Proc. Code. § 425.16 and Cal. Civ. Proc. Code. 
§ 425.17 (2016). 
 115. Jonathan Segel, Anti-SLAPP Law Make Benefit for Glorious Entertainment Industry of America: 
Borat, Reality Bites, and the Construction of an Anti-SLAPP Fence Around the First Amendment, 26 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 639, 652 (2009). 
 116. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code. § 425.16(a). 
 117. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code. § 425.17(b). 
 118. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code. § 425.17(b)-(c). 
 119. See generally O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1 (Supp. 2016); see also Evans Interview, supra note 27. 
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Constitutional Considerations 
The Act creates potential First Amendment, Seventh Amendment, 
and Fourteenth Amendment issues.120 First, the Act may be construed 
as limiting plaintiffs’ rights of petition by denying them an 
opportunity to fully pursue claims involving speech protected by the 
anti-SLAPP provisions. 121  The Act does not directly address this 
concern, but the same limitations have been challenged in the 
California courts.122 
In Bernardo v. Planned Parenthood Federation of America, a 
SLAPP plaintiff asserted that “section 425.16 violate[d] her First 
Amendment rights to petition and access the courts because it 
impose[d] a penalty and ‘liability for fees’ without requiring a 
showing that the suit is objectively frivolous.” 123  The California 
Appellate court rejected the argument and reasoned that “[t]he right 
to petition is not absolute, providing little or no protection for 
baseless litigation.”124 
The California Courts have also dealt with due process and equal 
protection concerns arising out of the state’s anti-SLAPP statute.125 
In Lafayette Morehouse, Inc. v. Chronicle Publishing Co., a SLAPP 
plaintiff argued that California’s anti-SLAPP statute limited its 
access to the judicial system, thus violating equal protection.126 The 
plaintiff further asserted “the combined effect of the [statute’s] 
discovery stay and 30-day [motion to strike] hearing requirement 
violated its due process rights because it was unable to defend 
adequately the motion to strike.” 127  Addressing the Due Process 
arguments, the court reasoned that the anti-SLAPP statute’s 
discovery stay did not violate a plaintiff’s due process rights because 
it did not preclude the court from ordering additional discovery 
before hearing a motion to strike if it deemed such discovery 
                                                                                                                 
 120. See O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1; see also Evans Interview, supra note 27. 
 121. See O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1(b). 
 122. See, e.g., Bernardo v. Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am., 115 Cal. App. 4th 322 (Cal. App. 4th 
Dist. 2004). 
 123. Bernardo, 115 Cal. App. 4th at 360. 
 124. Id. at 358 (quoting Equilon Enters. v. Consumer Cause, Inc., 29 Cal. 4th 53, 64 (2002)). 
 125. See Lafayette Morehouse, Inc. v. Chronicle Publ’g Co., 37 Cal. App. 4th 855 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. 
1995). 
 126. Id. at 865. 
 127. Id. at 865–67. 
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necessary.128 Courts in Georgia retain similar discretion regarding 
discovery under the Act.129 The Act’s discovery stay and thirty-day 
hearing requirements, although default procedures, are not 
mandatory.130 Subsection (d) of Code section 9-11-11.1 provides that 
“[t]he court, on noticed motion and for good cause shown, may order 
that specified discovery or other hearings or motions be 
conducted.”131 
The Lafayette court further held that the anti-SLAPP procedures 
did not violate equal protection rights because the statute’s early 
determination procedures were “rationally related” to the California 
Legislature’s valid government interests: encouraging public 
participation in matters of public significance and discouraging suits 
seeking to chill the valid exercise of First Amendment rights. 132 
Georgia applies the same “rational basis” standard to equal protection 
claims involving state statutes, making a similar result possible if the 
Act faced an equal protection challenge in the future.133 
Despite the existence of several California decisions upholding the 
constitutionality of anti-SLAPP legislation, not all courts have 
reached the same conclusions. Most notably, the Washington 
Supreme Court recently deemed its state’s anti-SLAPP statute as 
unconstitutional because it required trial judges to adjudicate factual 
questions without a trial, thus violating the plaintiff’s right to a jury 
trial under the state constitution.134 
Georgia Courts will likely have to deal with similar issues in the 
future. In particular, courts, litigators, and the General Assembly 
alike, should all look out for the types of abuse warned about by 
Representative Evans and already addressed by the California 
legislature. To avoid such abuse, the General Assembly may need to 
consider mirroring California’s law once again, and except certain 
types of public-interest actions from the burdensome anti-SLAPP 
                                                                                                                 
 128. Id. at 868. 
 129. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-11.1(d) (Supp. 2016) 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Lafayette Morehouse, Inc., 37 Cal. App. 4th at 865. 
 133. See Henry v. State, 263 Ga. 417, 418, 434 S.E.2d 469, 471 (1993) (“[S]tatutory classifications 
are presumed valid and will survive an equal protection challenge if the classification bears a rational 
relationship to a legitimate government interest.”). 
 134. Davis v. Cox, 351 P.3d 862, 864 (Wash. 2015). 
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procedure. In addition, Courts can help the Act to function effectively 
by using the discretion regarding discovery and hearings that the Act 
affords. By exercising discretion, rather than indiscriminately 
applying the Act’s default procedures, courts can help to ensure that 
the free speech rights of defendants, especially powerful business 
defendants, do not receive protection by wrongfully limiting the 
constitutional rights of plaintiffs. 
Pierre-Joseph Noebes & Rachael Reed 
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